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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/REPRODUCTIVE
JUSTICE—BREAKING THE TRAP: HOW WHOLE
WOMAN’S HEALTH PROTECTS ABORTION ACCESS, AND THE
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE’S REBUKE OF ANTIABORTION REGULATIONS
Chelsea M. Donaldson
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Substantive Due Process Clause is a
powerful sword that protects certain rights and liberties. Most of
these non-fundamental rights are examined underneath the “rational
basis” standard of constitutional review. Despite being a right
protected underneath the Substantive Due Process Clause, abortion
stands alone in using a unique form of constitutional review: Planned
Parenthood v. Casey’s “undue burden” standard.
The striking down of Roe v. Wade’s trimester analysis, and the
subsequent creation of the “undue burden” standard, resulted in a
catastrophic tidal wave of targeted regulations against abortion
providers (TRAP laws). One such TRAP law, House Bill 2 (H.B. 2),
was challenged. The resulting lawsuit, Whole Woman’s Health v.
Hellerstedt, declared that H.B. 2 was unconstitutional, using an
analysis that diverged from standard abortion jurisprudence.
This Note examines the Court’s history of Substantive Due Process
jurisprudence, contrasting abortion with other non-fundamental
rights and liberties. It posits that the Substantive Due Process Clause
not only should have been used all along to defend the constitutional
right to access safe and legal abortion, but the Court’s latest
examination of abortion in access provides a strengthened form of
review to judge abortion restriction: “undue burden with ‘bite.’”

 Candidate for J.D. Western New England University School of Law 2018, M.S.W.
Springfield College 2018. A special thank you to Professor Taylor Flynn, for her guidance in
writing this Note, and to the Western New England Law Review, for their support of my
passions. This Note is dedicated to my mother, Cindy, who not only removed the word
“impossible” from my vocabulary at a very young age, but challenged me to utilize my
strengths for the greater good. Without her, I would not know that when we fight, we win.
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So long as this Court adheres to Roe v. Wade . . . and Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey . . .,
Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers laws like H.B. 2
that ‘do little or nothing for health, but rather strew
impediments to abortion,’ . . . cannot survive judicial
inspection.1
INTRODUCTION
Despite being utilized since the beginning of ancient civilizations,
abortion2 has always been different.3 A variety of ancient Greco-Roman
texts mention the procedure,4 yet it is continually debated throughout the
political sphere as to the legitimacy of the practice as a constitutional
right. It is a rare sight to go through a single political election without
hearing about the future of Roe v. Wade or attempts to galvanize
respective political bases utilizing reproductive justice as a tool for
success or failure.5 Most political platforms have some sort of position
on the nature of abortion or reproductive justice as a whole,6 and quite a
few constituents vote with the politician’s position on abortion in mind.7

1. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2321 (2016) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (citations omitted).
2. “An artificially induced termination of a pregnancy for the purpose of destroying an
embryo or fetus.” Abortion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
3. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992). “Abortion is
a unique act. It is an act fraught with consequences for others . . . .” Id.
4. It is impossible to peg down exactly where abortion began as a procedure, but there
are a variety of mentions of the procedures held within ancient Greco-Roman texts—including
Plato’s Theaetetus. See TIMOTHY D. J. CHAPPELL, READING PLATO’S THEAETETUS 42–45
(2005).
5. The rise of the “Tea Party” movement (a far-right section of the Republican Party)
within the United States has led to a resurgence of anti-abortion policies across the country
and has driven the Democratic Party to become more left-leaning in response. See Neal
Devins, Rethinking Judicial Minimalism: Abortion Politics, Party Polarization, and the
Consequences of Returning the Constitution to Elected Government, 69 VAND. L. REV. 935,
969–71 (2016) [hereinafter Judicial Minimalism]. This extreme resurgence of partisan politics
left abortion in the dark as a protected constitutional right, as there was absolutely no middle
ground to be found throughout the majority of both the Bush and Obama Administrations. Id.
6. President Trump, in the third Presidential debate of the 2016 Election, declared
abortion to be an act of murder: “If you go with what [Secretary Hillary Clinton] is saying, in
the ninth month, you can take the baby and rip the baby out of the womb of the mother just
prior to the birth of the baby.” See Danielle Paquette, ‘Rip the Baby out of the Womb’: What
Donald Trump Got Wrong About Abortion in America, WASH. POST (Oct. 20, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/10/20/rip-the-baby-out-of-the-wombwhat-donald-trump-got-wrong-about-abortion-in-america [https://perma.cc/Z7Z2-NKR9].
7. For Americans, the feelings regarding abortion remain split—as they have for quite
some time. For an updated and expansive survey on how abortion affects voting choices and
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It is unrealistic, then, to expect that this political divisiveness would not
leak into the court system.
The decision of Planned Parenthood v. Casey,8 combined with the
newfound deference toward the state legislators in regard to abortion,
has led to an alarming rate of anti-abortion regulations passing through
state legislature.9 These targeted regulations of abortion providers
(TRAP laws) are passed under the guise of protecting the health and
safety of women, but in actuality do nothing except place a burden upon
women who seek a safe and legal abortion.10
Many factors contribute to these laws. The political divisiveness of
abortion, in addition to pseudoscience11 offered as legitimate medical
fact, has caused the worst attack on abortion providers since before Roe
v. Wade.12 Plenty of misinformation pervades the country concerning
the practice of abortion; the problem is that much of this pseudoscience
has leaked into the courts.13 This pseudoscience (ranging from the
effectiveness of abortion medication to the near-constant debate of

how Americans view abortion as a whole, see Abortion, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/
1576/abortion.aspx [https://perma.cc/U6PS-A5FL].
8. See generally Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
9. See Michael A. Althouse, Note, The Creation of an Undue Burden: Arizona House
Bill 2036 and State Abortion Regulations Post-Casey, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 173,
178 (2013).
10. See id. at 181 (“While facially neutral, the laws have likely the intent, and often
effect, of forcing medical facilities to stop providing abortions.”).
11. “A system of theories, assumptions, and methods erroneously regarded as
scientific.” Pseudoscience, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (11th ed. 2003). While pseudoscience is not
the core subject of this Note, its presence is seen numerous times within both Congress and
the court system in order to justify restrictions of abortion. For example, in October 2017, the
Republican-controlled House of Representatives passed the Pain-Capable Unborn Child
Protection Act, a federal ban on abortion after twenty weeks under the supposed knowledge
that fetuses feel pain, despite the fact that, according to the American Congress of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), fetuses do not feel pain until well into the third
trimester of pregnancy. See Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act, H.R. 36, 115th Cong.
(2017) (as passed by H. Rep., Oct. 3, 2017) (a proposed bill to ban abortion after twenty
weeks, utilizing pseudoscience as the basis of reasoning); cf. Am. Cong. of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, Facts Are Important: Fetal Pain, AM. CONG. OBSTETRICIANS &
GYNECOLOGISTS (July 2013), https://www.acog.org/-/media/Departments/GovernmentRelations-and-Outreach/FactAreImportFetalPain.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2MF-TX4M] (stating
that “fetal pain” is an anti-abortion tactic and is scientifically proven to not exist until much
later in the pregnancy).
12. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1972).
13. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 932 (2000) (commenting upon the State’s
failure to counteract established medical findings with a legitimate state interest); cf. Gonzales
v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 175–76 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (referencing the inaccurate
medical findings that Congress relied upon when passing the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act
of 2003).
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whether viability is a legitimate measure by which to judge termination
limits) has led to the creation of many TRAP laws which (until very
recently) were considered constitutional.14
The emotional and difficult decision that is obtaining an abortion
will not go undiscussed in this Note. An abortion can provide lifechanging opportunities for a woman, or mean death for a woman who
desperately requires medical assistance.15 But, too often, abortion
providers or clinics are nearly impossible to find depending on what
state the woman lives in.16 Attacks against abortion over the past forty
years have dealt a significant blow to an essential medical procedure that
is not only protected by the Constitution, but necessary to promote the
health and wellbeing of women.17
In contrast to other fundamental rights, abortion is constantly
debated and forced to justify itself each election cycle. This undermines
a hard-fought right that, in truth, has yet to be properly won. However,
victories—though few—are well-earned. One of those victories, Whole
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,18 is the central topic of this Note. This
Note will argue that Whole Woman’s Health not only provides a stronger
constitutional basis for protecting abortion access, but places abortion
access within standard Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, thereby
unifying the Substantive Due Process Clause and its approach to rational
basis review.
Part I of this Note will examine the historical underpinnings of the

14. Althouse, supra note 9, at 174. For more information on the debate of
pseudoscience in abortion, see Kelly Kasulis, #TheyFeelPain: Doctors Say the GOP’s AntiAbortion Campaign is Based on Pseudoscience, MIC (Oct. 4, 2017), https://mic.com/articles/
184990/theyfeelpain-doctors-say-the-gops-anti-abortion-campaign-is-based-on-pseudoscience
[https://perma.cc/79HD-9A8W].
15. Planned Parenthood (the largest abortion provider in the United States) has a
helpful guide to determining whether an abortion is the right choice for you. Within it,
Planned Parenthood lists off multiple reasons why women obtain abortions, ranging from not
being able to be a parent to not being physically able to carry the child to term. See
Considering Abortion, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, https://www.plannedparenthood.org/learn/
abortion/considering-abortion [https://perma.cc/HL9L-F7WD].
16. “Abortion clinics in the U.S. have closed at a record pace. In five states—
Mississippi, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota and Wyoming—just one remains.” Esmé
E. Deprez, U.S. Abortion Rights Fight, BLOOMBERG QUICKTAKE (updated July 7, 2016,
10:18 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/abortion-and-the-decline-of-clinics.
17. Planned Parenthood estimates that out of the millions of unplanned pregnancies
every year, four out of ten end in abortion. Considering Abortion, supra note 15. Overall,
three out of ten women by the age of forty-five will have an abortion. Id.
18. See generally Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
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Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.19 Part II
of this Note will examine the history of abortion access within the
United States, with a specific focus on the interpretation of the
Substantive Due Process Clause and how it applies to different standards
of scrutiny within the sphere of abortion. Part III of this Note will then
examine Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt20 in its entirety. Part IV
of this Note will argue that Whole Woman’s Health has taken a step
away from Planned Parenthood v. Casey’s undue burden standard,21 and
has instead implemented a heightened standard of review by which the
court system can judge TRAP laws. Finally, this Note will conclude that
(1) Whole Woman’s Health’s “undue burden with teeth” standard
provides more protection for abortion access than Casey, requiring a
greater scrutiny of the relationship between a state’s legitimate interest
and the burden placed upon a woman seeking an abortion; (2) Whole
Woman’s Health is the new standard against which the court system
must judge TRAP laws; and (3) that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment’s Substantive Due Process
Clause bolsters Whole Woman’s Health into a more protective, less
deferential test to protect abortion access.
I.

THE SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE

The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868,22 grouped with the
other “Civil War” Amendments23 to the United States Constitution. The
Fourteenth Amendment acted as an order to the states; it required
compliance with the Bill of Rights and added protections for former
slaves, holding state actors accountable for constitutional violations.24
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
20. See generally Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. 2292.
21. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also Joint Resolution Proposing an Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States, Article XIV (July 21, 1868), LIBRARY CONG.,
https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llsl&fileName=015/llsl015.db&recNum=742
[https://perma.cc/AM78-WZQM].
23. The “Civil War” or “Reconstruction” Amendments are the colloquial terms for
Amendments Thirteen through Fifteen of the United States Constitution. See The Landmark
Legislation: Thirteenth, Fourteenth, & Fifteenth Amendments, U.S. SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/CivilWarAmendments.htm
[https://perma.cc/MVT7-CLFL]. They concern the abolishment of slavery, equal protection,
due process, and the right to vote irrespective of race, respectively. See U.S. CONST. amends.
XIII–XV.
24. The notion that the Fourteenth Amendment forces the Bill of Rights upon the States
is one that the Supreme Court has grappled with since the ratification of the Amendment. See
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486–88 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). Some
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Located within the Fourteenth Amendment is the Due Process Clause,
which prohibits states from denying a person their life, liberty, or
property without due process of the law.25 Further, the Court has
referenced that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
includes a “‘substantive’ component that protects certain liberty interests
against state deprivation ‘no matter what process is provided.’”26 The
differentiation between substantive due process and procedural due
process was crafted with the understanding that some liberties and rights
are “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental.”27 With this in mind, the Substantive Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a powerful tool
to protect civil liberties, including abortion access.28
As the United States moved into the Reconstruction Era, the Court
was faced with the reality of a torn nation coming to terms with the
aftermath of a brutal Civil War.29 A denial of liberty or property without
due process of the law contradicts an essential cornerstone of American
ideology.30 However, the Court had to face the stark reality of the statelevel constitutional violations in a rapidly emerging Jim Crow world,
and what that meant for forging a new area of jurisprudence.31
Supreme Court Justices have viewed the Fourteenth Amendment as embracing the Bill of
Rights within its definition of “liberty;” others viewed it as a stand-alone Amendment. Id.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”) (emphasis
added).
26. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2616 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
27. Synder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
28. The most recent achievements of the Substantive Due Process Clause can be found
within Obergefell and the right to marry. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2626 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting). While marriage has been considered a constitutionally protected right, the
redefinition of marriage to include same-sex couples was considered, by some, to be
revolutionary—and perhaps even unconstitutional in and of itself. Id.
29. The Reconstruction Era refers to the period of time immediately following the Civil
War. See Edward L. Ayers, Reconstruction, GILDER LEHRMAN INST. AM. HIST.,
https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/reconstruction/essays/reconstruction
(last
visited Jan. 3, 2017). The United States faced the end of slavery, the creation of new civil
liberties, and the daunting prospect of unifying a once divided nation. Id.
30. Within the twenty-seven Amendments to the United States Constitution, the denial
of due process is referenced in two of them—the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment, both
which rule that a denial of due process by the Federal or State Government is unconstitutional.
U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV.
31. The term “Jim Crow” refers to American de jure segregation. See MICHELLE
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS
30–35 (rev. ed. 2012). Despite the Union’s victory in the Civil War, Black Americans faced
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As applied to abortion, constitutional standards of review have a
complex history that will be discussed in Part II of this Note. Initially, a
discussion of constitutional standards of review as applied to the
Substantive Due Process Clause is needed in order to fully understand
the impact of Whole Woman’s Health upon abortion rights and
Substantive Due Process jurisprudence.
A. Standards of Constitutional Review
The Supreme Court has two primary standards of review when
examining substantive due process cases: strict scrutiny, for fundamental
rights; and rational basis review, for those rights deemed nonfundamental.32 Depending on which protected class or conduct the
Court is examining in any given case, the standard of review may vary.
Strict scrutiny is a skeptical standard of review, requiring that the
legislation enacted be “narrowly tailored”33 to suit the state’s compelling
interest by the least restrictive means possible.34 Strict scrutiny is the
highest burden upon the state and is usually applied when the challenged
legislation specifically targets classes of people based on race, national
origin,35 or when a law infringes upon a fundamental right.36
Rational basis is the least imposing standard of review, typically
granting great deference to the legislature.37 The Court’s test for rational
basis holds that “legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained

further discrimination and violence underneath the State despite the constitutional protections
enacted following the War. Id.
32. “There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution,
such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be
embraced within the Fourteenth.” United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
33. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301 (1993).
34. Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 (1984).
35. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (“It should be noted, to
begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are
immediately suspect.”). Ultimately, Korematsu’s detention during the Second World War was
deemed reasonably justified due to the wartime necessity of keeping track of potential enemy
combatants, most of whom were of Japanese descent. Id. at 219–24.
36. See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (“[L]egislation which restricts those
political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable
legislation, [may] be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment.”) (citations omitted).
37. “Unlike under heightened scrutiny, in a rational basis equal protection analysis
courts look to any ‘conceivable basis’ for the challenged law, not limited to those articulated
by or even consistent with the rationales offered by the legislature.” Windsor v. United States,
699 F.3d 169, 196 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
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if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.”38 The standard of review by which abortion
was judged, before the advent of Whole Woman’s Health, is placed
within this area of constitutional review, though the “undue burden”
standard is not identical.39
While rational basis review is, arguably, the least stringent of the
three standards, the standard still requires a certain “nexus” of a logical
conclusion between the regulation and the legitimate state interest at
hand.40 Most rational basis standards compel state actors to provide at
least some level of evidence beyond “compelling state interest” in order
to pass a rational basis review of a specific act of legislation.41 The
Lawrence Court did not find morality a compelling-enough state interest
to warrant criminalizing sexual intimacy between same-sex partners by
enacting an anti-sodomy statute, thereby resulting in a constitutional
violation.42
B. Is “Rational Basis” Rational?
While the rational basis standard of review is the most deferential of
the constitutional standards of review used by the Court, it has also taken
on a new life of its own in recent Court decisions.43 The Substantive
38. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (quoting City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)).
39. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874–75 (1992). The
undue burden standard is exclusive to abortion jurisprudence and departs from traditional
tiered standards of review utilized in other substantive due process jurisprudence. See infra
Part II (discussing the Casey doctrine and the evolution of abortion jurisprudence prior to
Whole Woman’s Health); cf. infra Subpart I.B (exploring substantive due process
jurisprudence with other fundamental rights, such as marriage and privacy within the home).
40. Emma Freeman, Note, Giving Casey Its Bite Back: The Role of Rational Basis
Review in Undue Burden Analysis, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279, 279–80 (2013). Despite
this, the Court has remained exceedingly deferential to the legislature underneath rational
basis review, even going so far as supplying hypothetical state interests in lieu of the
purported failed interest. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483,
487–88 (1955).
41. It should be noted that the standard utilized in Lawrence is what many scholars
refer to as “rational basis with bite” or rational basis plus, as it held Texas to a greater
standard than usually required under the Supreme Court’s past interpretations of the rational
basis standard. For a more in-depth analysis of “rational basis with bite,” see generally Gayle
Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62
IND. L.J. 779 (1987).
42. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (holding that anti-sodomy laws violated the
Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
43. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2320 (2016)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (holding that Texas did not meet their burden
when passing two TRAP laws that shut down over half of the abortion clinics within the

2018]

REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE—BREAKING THE TRAP

265

Due Process Clause cannot be swept aside every time a state has a
rational basis for legislating against a protected class or right, but state
legislatures must also be free to regulate when necessary.44 A middle
ground must be met.
The Court’s discretionary application of rational basis review has
been discussed by countless legal scholars.45 However, the problem with
rational basis review is exceptionally apparent in substantive due process
cases.46 The Court has created a multitude of pathways to rational basis
review, but has yet to define it into a unitary standard.47 While rational
basis review is supposed to be the most deferential of standards, the
Supreme Court uses it with much discretion and little cohesion.48
Rational basis is the standard of review that was utilized to
determine a violation of the Substantive Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment in a number of
Supreme Court cases concerning sexual orientation49 and sexual

state); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (2015) (striking down same-sex
marriage bans as a violation of the Substantive Due Process Clause, as the states did not meet
their burden); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013) (invalidating the
Defense of Marriage Act as a violation of the Substantive Due Process Clause, as the
legitimate government interest of the sanctity of marriage was not enough to meet the burden
of proof).
44. The Tenth Amendment grants all powers to the States that are not specifically
mentioned within the Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. X. However, the Court, while stating
that the Tenth Amendment does protect state sovereignty in some respects, has soundly
refuted the notion that the Tenth Amendment trumps the Fourteenth Amendment. See Hunter
v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 232 (1985).
45. For a more nuanced discussion of standards of review and the argument against the
Supreme Court’s discretionary application of rational basis review, see generally Suzanne B.
Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481 (2004). See also Judicial
Minimalism, supra note 5 (prompting an examination of partisan politics and the Supreme
Court’s weak approach to abortion jurisprudence).
46. See infra Sections I.B.1–3 (examining the history of the Substantive Due Process
Clause); cf. infra Part II (examining the Casey doctrine and subsequent abortion
jurisprudence).
47. See Goldberg, supra note 45, at 490 (“Yet, while the Court regularly explains its
approach to rational basis review, it has not offered a theory for making collective sense of its
variable lot of decisions.”).
48. Id. at 490–91.
49. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (2015) (holding that bans against
same-sex marriage violated both the Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013)
(holding that the discriminatory tax exemptions of the Defense of Marriage Act for
heterosexual peoples violated both the Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996) (holding that
the repeal of protective legislation for same-sex citizens violated the Equal Protection Clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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conduct.50 However, the Court’s application of the rational basis
standard in each of the cases leaves much to be desired when used to
protect certain rights and liberties, especially in terms of consistency.
With extraordinary division amongst the members of the Court, the
Supreme Court’s application of rational basis review, and the navigation
of the Substantive Due Process Clause, tends to be far stricter than
initially meets the eye—depending on what right the Court is examining.
1. The Lochner Era
Lochner v. New York launched a three-decades-long era of the Court
participating in “judicial activism,” utilizing the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Substantive Due Process Clause to read a fundamental
right to contract into the Constitution as a method of striking down labor
laws to protect workers, as well as portions of President Roosevelt’s
“New Deal” legislation to restore the economy from the disastrous
effects of the Great Depression.51 The Lochner era is widely understood
as a cautionary tale of what can happen when the Supreme Court does
not adequately defer to the legislature, at least with respect to economic
legislation and decisions.52 For better or for worse, it has also shaped
Substantive Due Process jurisprudence for the past one hundred years.53
Lochner struck down a New York statute meant to protect bakery
workers from unsafe working conditions,54 citing “freedom of contract”
between employer and employee as a fundamental right protected by the
Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.55 While
the freedom to form a contract was not a newly created right at the time
of Lochner,56 the Supreme Court’s intervention with the legislature
created a very real problem with the public’s perception of the purpose

50. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (holding that anti-sodomy
laws violated the Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
51. The Lochner decision has often been hailed as an example of “judicial activism”
and is frequently cited by the Court as a warning to err on the side of legislative deference.
See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874 (1987).
52. Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional
Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1, 1 (1991) (“Legal scholars and historians have generally depicted
the Lochner era as a deviant period during which the Supreme Court broke from the
constitutionalism that the Marshall Court established and the New Deal Court restored.”).
53. See id. at 6–7.
54. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).
55. Id. at 53; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
56. See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 587–88 (1897) (striking down a Louisiana
statute on the grounds of violating a person’s free right to contract underneath the Fourteenth
Amendment).
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of the Court: when is it appropriate for the Supreme Court to impose its
own theories upon the legislature and, by correlation, the people?57
Since its founding, the Court’s role has been to interpret the
Constitution, not to be involved in the executive or legislative branches
of government.58 When the Court acts as a “super-legislature,” it
undermines the power of the legislature itself.59 Since Lochner, the
Court has attempted to stay the course in terms of legislative deference
and wield a rational basis standard in order to determine whether or not
the legislature has overstepped its boundaries.60 Unfortunately, the
judiciary does not do so with an even hand—particularly in the area of
law known as reproductive justice.61 Despite an attempt to solidify the
approach to the doctrine with a narrowed scope of review for lower
courts to utilize, the judiciary has made a muddied history of the
Substantive Due Process Clause ever since.62 As this Note discusses, the
Supreme Court’s almost reactionary aversion to becoming a “superlegislative” body has caused a rift in reproductive justice jurisprudence,
particularly in the realm of abortion.

57. Justice Holmes’ dissent within Lochner warns of the Supreme Court imposing their
opinions regarding economics onto a legislature that clearly felt otherwise. See Lochner, 198
U.S. at 74–76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
58. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to
enquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they
have a discretion. Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the
constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.
Id.
59. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
60. See Malmed v. Thornburgh, 621 F.2d 565, 575–76 (3d Cir. 1980). Further, the
Supreme Court has since shelved the discussion of economics into the realm of the political
question doctrine: matters of how to run the government have been left to the politicians—not
the Supreme Court. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210–12 (1962) (offering a variety of
governmental actions that the Supreme Court will not delve into, including Native American
sovereignty and foreign relations). On the other hand, instances of government infraction that
tread into constitutional matters are within the Court’s purview. Id.
61. Despite the fact that abortion is now considered a protected right underneath the
Fourteenth Amendment, it did not start that way. Reproductive justice jurisprudence began
with Griswold v. Connecticut, where the right to privacy was found within the first
Amendment—not the Fourteenth. See Griswold, 381 U.S at 484–85.
62. “As with any aspect of substantive due process, a court using the irrebuttable
presumption doctrine must apply the rational basis test, or in appropriate cases, strict scrutiny.
Otherwise, the courts would be resorting to blatant ‘Lochnerism,’ a concept that has been
administered suitable last rites and mercifully interred.” Malmed, 621 F.2d at 575–76 (citation
omitted).
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2. Contraception: The Rejection of Lochner and the Establishment
of Privacy
In 1965, the Supreme Court decided Griswold v. Connecticut, a case
that established the fundamental right to contraception and privacy
within the home.63 The Griswold Court, in analyzing a challenge to
Connecticut’s then anti-contraception statute that penalized both medical
professionals and married couples alike, circumnavigated the resurgence
of Lochner by plainly stating that Lochner did not guide their decisionmaking.64 An interest in the sanctity of the marital bedroom and the
“penumbras of rights” encompassed by the Bill of Rights65 and the
Fourteenth Amendment66 drove the Court to strike down the anticontraception law, expanding the definition of “fundamental rights” to
include the right to privacy in deciding whether to bear or beget a
child.67
Griswold opened the door for both abortion access and the
convolution of abortion access jurisprudence. While Griswold had the
opportunity to strike down the Connecticut statute utilizing the
Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court chose instead to utilize established First Amendment
jurisprudence—an equally important amendment to the Constitution, but
one that provides shaky-at-best protection.68 Justice Harlan, in his
concurrence, warns against the Court’s insistence on utilizing a
“penumbra of rights” rather than the Fourteenth Amendment, stating that
“[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stands, in my
opinion, on its own bottom.”69 By not incorporating the right to privacy
and the right to marital contraception within the Substantive Due Process
Clause out of fear of “Lochnerizing,” Justice Harlan argues that the
Court has unwittingly imposed “an artificial and largely illusory
restriction on the content of the Due Process Clause.”70

63. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485–86.
64. Id. at 481–82.
65. The majority of Griswold made the determination that the First Amendment, held
within a penumbra of rights, established the right to privacy, thereby striking down the
Connecticut statute. See id. at 484–85.
66. Justice Goldberg’s concurrence provides a compelling argument that the concept of
“liberty” held within the Fourteenth Amendment protects such fundamental rights alone,
without absorbing the Bill of Rights. See id. at 486–88 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 485–86.
68. See id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring).
69. Id.
70. See id. at 502 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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The Court’s convoluted jurisprudence regarding contraception
continued with Eisenstadt v. Baird, which expanded the holding of
Griswold to include the right of contraception to unmarried couples.71
Again, Eisenstadt does not rely on the Substantive Due Process Clause
to determine that Massachusetts violated the Constitution; instead,
Eisenstadt grants unmarried couples the right to utilize contraception by
means of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.72
In later jurisprudence, the Court pointed out the close relationship
between the Substantive Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.73 In Eisenstadt, the clear divide
between two separate classes of people—married and unmarried—made
the determination of which clause to use relatively simple, when the
Court determined to apply the Equal Protection Clause.74 However, the
continued avoidance of utilizing the Substantive Due Process Clause out
of fear of judicial activism has created a divide within the Court’s
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.75 For some fundamental rights,
the Substantive Due Process Clause will gladly do most of the work,
(and will sometimes do so hand-in-hand with the Equal Protection
Clause).76
For others—namely, reproductive justice, and more
specifically, abortion—the standard is lessened and not granted the same
weight of constitutional authority.77
3. Romer vs. Lawrence: Equal Protection vs. Substantive Due
Process
The aversion of the Supreme Court to utilize the Substantive Due
Process Clause within the realm of reproductive justice is highlighted
when examining other areas of the law that the Due Process Clause
encompasses, such as private, adult, consensual sexual conduct.78 In
71. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443, 446–47 (1972).
72. See id. at 446–47.
73. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602–03 (2015).
74. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 443.
75. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602 (striking down same-sex marriage bans, and
rejecting the state’s historical “sanctity of marriage” argument); cf. Planned Parenthood of Se.
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (overturning Roe’s strict scrutiny standard in favor of
the “undue burden” standard, a lessened form of rational basis review).
76. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602–03.
77. The standard by which abortion is judged was originally a strict scrutiny standard,
protected underneath Roe v. Wade. See 410 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1973). It was lessened in
1992, with the decision in Casey and the invention of the “undue burden” standard. See
Casey, 505 U.S. at 874.
78. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (striking down an anti-

270

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:257

Lawrence v. Texas, the Court examined the prosecution of a gay man,
John Geddes Lawrence, for engaging in sodomy within the privacy of
his home.79 He was arrested for this act.80 On appeal, the Court struck
down the anti-sodomy statute Lawrence was prosecuted under, citing the
Substantive Due Process Clause as the protective piece of constitutional
law that Texas violated.81
Interestingly, the majority in Lawrence utilized both Griswold and
Eistenstadt82 as the foundation for establishing a right to privacy in one’s
home, even though neither of those cases utilizes the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.83 Justice Kennedy rejected the
argument that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
should take paramount importance when examining the Texan statute.84
Instead, Justice Kennedy chose to invalidate the statute under the
Substantive Due Process Clause to eradicate any opportunity for states to
re-draw statutes to allow for equal opportunity discrimination between
homosexual and heterosexual couples alike.85 This lack of deference to
the legislature, even when there is a purported state interest, has
commonly been labeled as “rational basis with bite.”86 In Lawrence, the
Court not only soundly rejected Texas’s state interest, but invalidated it
completely under the Substantive Due Process Clause without the
possibility of an alternate theory.87
To make matters even more complicated, Justice Kennedy cited the
Founding Fathers’ inability to “know[] the components of liberty in its
manifold possibilities” of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Due
Process Clauses when striking down the Texan anti-sodomy statute.88

sodomy statute as a violation of the Substantive Due Process Clause). In a prior case, the
Court utilized the Equal Protection Clause as the basis for protection. See Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996).
79. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562–63.
80. Id. at 563.
81. See id. at 578–79.
82. See id. at 564–65.
83. Justice Kennedy also made copious references to Roe v. Wade and Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, both of which rely on the Substantive Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 565–74; see also infra Part II.
84. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574–75, 578.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the Court has “applied a more
searching form of rational basis review” when the legislature treads into personal
relationships).
87. See id. at 578–79.
88. Id. at 578.
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Indeed, Justice Kennedy views the future as a wealth of possibilities in
examining the Substantive Due Process Clause, the potential of
fundamental rights expanding into the future as society’s awareness of
fundamental rights develops.89 This limitless area of possibilities stands
for the notion that the area of fundamental rights is constantly evolving
and argues for a more expansive approach to the Substantive Due
Process Clause, rather than a restrictive one.90
The decision to utilize the Substantive Due Process Clause in lieu of
the Equal Protection Clause is another confusing choice, as seven years
prior, Justice Kennedy struck down a targeted repeal of antidiscrimination protections against LGBTQ91 citizens primarily under the
Equal Protection Clause.92 In Romer v. Evans, Colorado amended its
constitution “in . . . a state-wide referendum.”93
The amendment
(Amendment 2) repealed ordinances across Colorado “to the extent they
prohibit discrimination on the basis of ‘homosexual . . . orientation,
conduct, practices, or relationships.’”94 The Colorado Supreme Court
struck down Amendment 2 by subjecting it to strict scrutiny, citing the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.95 The Supreme
Court affirmed, but under a different rationale96: Amendment 2 violated
the Constitution, but the Court applied a rational basis standard of review
rather than strict scrutiny.97
The dissenting opinions of both Romer and Lawrence cite similar
criticisms—specifically that the Court’s majority is forcing its respective
opinions onto the people.98 In Lawrence, the focus on “judicially

89. “[The Founding Fathers] knew that times can blind us to certain truths and later
generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress.
As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own
search for greater freedom.” Id. at 579.
90. See id.
91. LGBTQ is a common acronym that stands for “lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender,
queer.” Glossary of Terms, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/resources/
glossary-of-terms [https://perma.cc/9D2P-JJG4]. It is an umbrella term to generally
encompass the queer community. See id.
92. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624, 635 (1996).
93. Id. at 623.
94. Id. at 624 (quoting COLO. CONST., Art. II, § 30b (1993).
95. Romer, 517 U.S. at 625.
96. Id. at 626.
97. See id. at 631–32 (“[I]f a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a
suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation
to some legitimate end.”).
98. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 587–88 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see
also Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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invented . . . rights”99 and the criticism of expanding further into
Lochner-esque territory weighed on the minds of the dissenting authors
who accused the majority of protecting some controversial opinions
(namely, abortion rights) and striking down others (here, anti-sodomy
laws).100 For Justice Scalia, the notion of placing homosexuality on the
same level of scrutiny as race or religion was something to be left to the
legislatures and the people, not to the Supreme Court of the United
States.101 Both Lawrence and Romer, ultimately, granted protections to
LGBTQ citizens by extending a rational basis standard in the face of a
newly created protected class; but the reliance (or lack thereof) upon the
Substantive Due Process Clause further complicates the jurisprudence on
which abortion access, as will be discussed in Part II, relies.102
4. Sexual Orientation: Obergefell
Substantive Due Process

and

the

Expansion

of

In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court rejected the States’
arguments for same-sex marriage bans, concluding that the historical
nuances of marriage being solely between one man and one woman was
not a legitimate state interest in the face of the discrimination imposed
upon LGBTQ couples seeking marriage rights.103 Additionally, Justice
Kennedy stated that the Fourteenth Amendment’s “liberties extend to
certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy.”104
This groups Obergefell’s central holding—the constitutional right to
marriage, regardless of sexual orientation—with other non-fundamental
rights, such as obtaining birth control.105 Even further, the declaration of
same-sex marriage as a constitutionally protected activity was done by
utilizing the rational basis standard: weighing the state’s legitimate
interest in protecting the sanctity of marriage against Jim Obergefell’s

99. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 587 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
100. See id. at 588 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
101. Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102. See Amelia Craig Cramer, The Freedom to Marry Must Not Be Denied, ARIZ.
ATT’Y 14, 18–19 (Mar. 2004), https://www.myazbar.org/AZAttorney/PDF_Articles/
0304SameSexPRO.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZU8R-BBT6] (citing Lawrence and Romer as an
expansion of civil protections for LGBTQ couples and a rejection of bias as a legitimate state
interest).
103. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602–03 (2015) (granting same-sex
couples the right to marry while refuting the historical “one man and one woman” argument
the States provide as a legitimate interest).
104. Id. at 2597.
105. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–86 (1965).
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right to have his marriage validated by the state of Ohio.106
Interestingly, Obergefell utilizes both the Equal Protection Clause
and the Substantive Due Process Clause in harmony to strike down
numerous same-sex marriage bans.107 Again, as with the sexual
intimacy cases, Obergefell cited the contraception cases Griswold and
Eisenstadt in order to define the concept of liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause (in addition to most of the rights held within the Bill of
Rights) as “personal choices central to individual dignity and
autonomy,” when neither case utilized the Due Process Clause directly
in their determination of reproductive justice as a fundamental right.108
And, again, Justice Kennedy remarked upon the potential of the future,
defining fundamental rights by reminding states that the very definition
of “rights” must be malleable.109
The dissenting opinions in Obergefell call attention to the Court’s
arguably Lochner-esque approach to the Substantive Due Process
Clause.110 The dissents accuse the majority of applying their own vision
of what a fundamental right is,111 arguing that this supplants rational
basis review by simply declaring what the law should be, rather than
what the law is.112 Justice Scalia’s dissent argues that the majority
overstepped its boundaries into the legislative branch, overturning gay
marriage bans because they interpreted the right to same-sex marriage as
one protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.113 The Fourteenth
Amendment’s Substantive Due Process Clause has, after Obergefell,
molded rational basis into a standard that can, in conjunction with the
Equal Protection Clause, encompass groups of people that have been
stigmatized or targeted, regardless of the historical or legislative

106. The state interest in preserving the “sanctity of marriage” is an argument that the
Court rejected in Obergefell, citing a long history of expanding constitutional rights to groups
that were previously unable to access them due to historical bias or prejudice at the time.
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602 (“If rights were defined by who exercised them in the past, then
received practices could serve as their own continued justification and new groups could not
invoke rights once denied.”).
107. See id. at 2602–04 (exploring the connection of the Substantive Due Process
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause, particularly in regard to marriage jurisprudence).
108. Id. at 2597–98.
109. Id. at 2602.
110. See id. at 2616 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). “[T]he majority’s approach has no
basis in principle or tradition, except for the un-principled tradition of judicial policymaking
that characterized discredited decisions such as Lochner v. New York.” Id.
111. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2623 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The Court today not
only overlooks our country’s entire history and tradition but actively repudiates it . . . .”).
112. Id. at 2611.
113. See id. at 2629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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reasoning that states have relied on for hundreds of years.114
5. Judicial Activism and Fundamental Rights: Rational Basis
Review Resolved?
The notion of judicial activism is pervasive in many dissenting
opinions surrounding the Substantive Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. This only bolsters the argument that the
Supreme Court’s method in approaching the Substantive Due Process
Clause—especially when rational basis scrutiny is involved—seems to
be a “flavor of the day” approach.115 The Court’s selective usage of the
Substantive Due Process Clause is not a novel legal conclusion—if
anything, it is a frequently discussed and debated one.116 That said,
rational basis review and the determination of what constitutes a
fundamental right holds significant strength in determining whether or
not a state has overstepped its boundaries in regard to a deprivation of
life, liberty, or property.117 In addition, the Court has combined the
Equal Protection Clause, the Substantive Due Process Clause, and their
respective tests in recent jurisprudence, leading to even more
confusion—and debate—on which test and which clause meets which
standard.118 Thus, the standard of review is rational basis when
determining whether the person’s conduct is protected by the states’
intrusion; it is then simply a question of whether or not the Court deems
that specific right, as applied, worth protecting.119

114. See id. at 2629–30 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
115. See supra Sections I.B.1–4.
116. For a more nuanced discussion on the fallout of judicial activism and Lochner, see
Sunstein, supra note 51. See generally Goldberg, supra note 45 (arguing for a single-tiered
approach to the Equal Protection Clause, rather than the multi-tiered, flawed approach that the
Court currently utilizes).
117. See Malmed v. Thornburgh, 621 F.2d 565, 575–77 (3d Cir. 1980).
118. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 640 n.1 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). “The
Court evidently agrees that ‘rational basis’—the normal test for compliance with the Equal
Protection Clause—is the governing standard.” Id.; cf. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584,
2602–03 (2015). “The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a
profound way, though they set forth independent principles.” Id. “Each concept—liberty and
equal protection—leads to a stronger understanding of the other.” Id. at 2603.
119. There is a great divide among multiple Court benches on the issue of whether the
right to seek an abortion should be protected by the Constitution. See Planned Parenthood of
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 944 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 981–82 (Scalia,
J., dissenting); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 172–73 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This is
not a settled issue by any means; the dissents of Whole Woman’s Health are rife with
suggestions to overturn Roe v. Wade. See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S.
Ct. 2292, 2324 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting).

2018]

REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE—BREAKING THE TRAP

275

So what, exactly, is a right worth protecting? Fundamental rights,
outside of the legal context, seem to be easily defined by the layman, but
even legal scholars and wordsmiths shroud the definition in vague and
confusing language.120 It is easy to be thrilled when the Court makes a
determination that you feel benefits your specific cause of action,121 but
an examination of the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence (a
willingness to err on the side of the legislature for some fundamental
rights over others) leaves much room for a revocation of the same rights
the Court had eagerly defended just the case before.122 It is this lack of
consistency—combined with the political vagaries of constituting a
majority—that created the Casey predicament with abortion.
Specifically, how can something be a fundamental right when the Court
is so deferential to the legislature in restricting access to said
fundamental right?123
Ultimately, the Court’s heavy hand when examining the Substantive
Due Process Clause seems to hinge on what the Court believes to be a
fundamental right and whether the State has offered a compelling
enough reason to infringe upon it.124 The Court’s fear of appearing
Lochner-esque and allowing the legislature a large amount of deference
has proven dangerous in the past—Dred Scott125 is not ancient history.

120. Fundamental right, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, (10th ed. 2014).
A significant component of liberty, encroachments of which are rigorously tested
by courts to ascertain the soundness of purported governmental justifications. A
fundamental right triggers strict scrutiny to determine whether the law violates the
Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. As
enunciated by the Supreme Court, fundamental rights include voting, interstate
travel, and various aspects of privacy (such as marriage and contraception rights).
Id. (emphasis added).
121. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2626 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Celebrate the
achievement of a desired goal. Celebrate the opportunity for a new expression of commitment
to a partner. Celebrate the availability of new benefits. But do not celebrate the Constitution.
It had nothing to do with it.”).
122. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164 (striking down abortion bans as unconstitutional
underneath the Substantive Due Process Clause); cf. Casey, 505 U.S. at 874 (striking down
Roe’s standard of review to replace it with a more legislature-friendly “undue burden”
standard).
123. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 874.
124. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2615–16 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (exploring the
notion that the Court upended the power from the legislature and utilized the Substantive Due
Process Clause to expand the definition of marriage to include same-sex couples with no legal
basis).
125. See Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 406 (1857) (declaring Dred Scott, a
Black man, not a citizen of the United States and therefore incapable of suing for his or his
family’s freedom in court), superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
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But for the protection of abortion access, the muddiness of the rational
basis standard and the Supreme Court’s willingness to curtail certain
fundamental freedoms while expanding others has done more harm than
good.126
II.

THE BEGINNINGS OF ABORTION ACCESS

Abortion access is considered a fundamental right under the United
States Constitution.127 Despite this, abortion remains a divisive issue
among the American public. The political atmosphere that often
surrounds the procedure of abortion cannot, and will not, be ignored in
this Note. Abortion is a crux within each election cycle that is frequently
debated and argued as a fundamental right that should or should not
exist.128 The jurisprudence surrounding abortion is equally controversial
and dramatic, due to frequent rehashing by legal scholars upon each
dispositive abortion-related Supreme Court decision.129 Whole Woman’s
Health is no exception.130
This Note examines the history of abortion access with the purpose
of extracting the legal language surrounding the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Substantive Due Process Clause in order to parse through
the standard of review utilized in the Court’s most recent decision to
protect abortion access in Texas.131 Before that discussion can take
place, however, this Note must discuss a prior Texas abortion case first:
Roe v. Wade.132
A. Roe v. Wade and Strict Scrutiny
In 1973, the Supreme Court decriminalized abortion in the seminal

126. See infra Part II.
127. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164.
128. See supra Introduction.
129. The conversation surrounding Casey, the Supreme Court case upon which the
“undue burden” standard emerged, continues to develop, even after twenty years. See
Freeman, supra note 40. See generally R. Randall Kelso, The Structure of Planned
Parenthood v. Casey Abortion Rights Law: Strict Scrutiny for Substantial Obstacles on
Abortion Choice and Otherwise Reasonableness Balancing, 34 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 75
(2015).
130. See Scott Skinner-Thompson et al., Marriage, Abortion, and Coming Out, 116
COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 126, 138–42 (2016); see also Elizabeth Price Foley, Whole
Woman’s Health and the Supreme Court’s Kaleidoscopic Review of Constitutional Rights,
2015 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 153, 169–75 (2016).
131. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2320 (2016); see also
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
132. See generally Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
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case, Roe v. Wade.133 In decriminalizing abortion, the Court examined
the standard of review to be utilized in assessing the power of the State
in regulating the procedure.134 While the Court declared a ban on
abortion as a violation of the Substantive Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment,135 the Court also determined that a state had a
legitimate interest “in protecting the potentiality of human life” after the
first trimester.136 By declaring that states have some power to regulate
abortion, the Court crafted a standard of review by which to evaluate
states’ legislative attempts to restrict both the practice of and access to
abortion procedures.137 Per the decision in Roe, a state’s ability to
restrict a woman’s right to an abortion became more suspect the less
viable the fetus was, and more tolerable the farther along a woman’s
pregnancy progressed,138 because a state had a legitimate interest in both
women’s health and protecting the potentiality of life.139 Miraculously,
the Court handed down a strict scrutiny standard to protect abortion
access in a time where the prospects of seeking a legal abortion in some
areas of the country was practically impossible.140
This strict scrutiny standard was an exemplary depiction of the art
of compromise. Abortion was protected by the Substantive Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but a state was also able to
regulate within a (relatively) bright line rule of law that the Court
enacted.141 Toeing the line of the Roe standard involved forcing a state
to make a compelling argument for protecting both the safety of women
and fetal welfare, and to provide a cut-off point where the states could
not regulate.142 In other words, there was no carte blanche handed to
133. See id. at 164 (“A state criminal abortion statute of the current Texas type, that
excepts from criminality only a life-saving procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard
to pregnancy stage and without recognition of the other interests involved, is violative of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”) (emphasis removed).
134. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992).
135. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. “No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” Id. (emphasis
added).
136. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
137. See id. at 162–63.
138. Id. at 163.
139. Id. at 162.
140. See David A. Grimes, The Bad Old Days: Abortion in America Before Roe v.
Wade, HUFFINGTON POST BLOG (Jan. 15, 2015, 12:27 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
david-a-grimes/the-bad-old-days-abortion_b_6324610.html [https://perma.cc/WWA6-NEPZ].
141. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 162–63.
142. This standard was overturned with the Casey Court, who believed that Roe’s
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legislators when it came to abortion-related regulations.143 During the
first trimester (or pre-viability), the state must take a step back because
strict scrutiny applies.144 After the first trimester (or post-viability), the
courts are willing to be more lenient with the legislatures’ attempts at
regulating or restricting abortion access, and rational basis review
became the acceptable standard of review.145
Though the Roe Court utilized both Griswold and Eisenstadt to
establish the right to privacy and personal autonomy,146 Justice
Blackmun cites more often than not to the concurring opinions in
Griswold, which warned of the devaluation of the Fourteenth
Amendment if it were placed second to the “penumbra of rights”
doctrine that was utilized by the majority.147 However, Justice Stewart’s
concurring opinion in Roe states what the concurring opinions of
Griswold had stated all along, that Griswold is an exercise of the
Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
should remain as such.148
While Roe provides a solid beginning for abortion as a fundamental
right with a bright-line rule on when a state could regulate the procedure,
it rests on shaky foundation.149 In direct contrast to Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence (both before Roe and after), Roe’s abortion
protection is akin to a stone house standing on wooden stilts: it was built

bright line rule ran contrary to its own logic. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 876 (1992) (“Before viability, Roe and subsequent cases treat all governmental
attempts to influence a woman’s decision on behalf of the potential life within her as
unwarranted. This treatment is, in our judgment, incompatible with the recognition that there
is a substantial state interest in potential life throughout pregnancy.”).
143. With Casey’s looser standard (and Roe’s overturn in part) came greater freedom
for legislatures to enact TRAP laws. See Nina Martin, The Supreme Court Case That Made a
Mess of Abortion Rights, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 29, 2016, 11:00 AM),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/02/supreme-court-decision-mess-abortion-rights
[https://perma.cc/M8VL-MRJQ] (“After Roe established abortion rights, Planned Parenthood
v. Casey reined them in, creating a new legal standard that gave states greater leeway to
regulate the procedure.”).
144. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 876.
145. See id. at 870.
146. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 129.
147. See id. at 219.
148. Id. at 167–68 (Stewart, J., concurring).
149. While Roe utilizes the Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment in protecting abortion access, it relies upon the contraception cases for legal
standing, which utilize the “penumbra of rights” doctrine held within the First Amendment.
See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443, 456–57 (1972); see also Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 502 (1965) (White, J., concurring).
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with the best of intentions, but the foundation was not meant to last. 150
The Court’s reluctance to grant the full protection of the Substantive Due
Process Clause to reproductive justice with contraception provides a
muddied and murky pathway of legal logic, particularly when you
compare Roe to other areas of protection.151 Placing abortion (during the
first trimester) in the same protective categories as other fundamental
rights had the best of intentions, but challenges began to rise almost
immediately to protest the Court’s presumed super-legislative exercise of
power in creating a space for abortion in the hall of fundamental rights
and liberties protected under the Constitution.152
B. Planned Parenthood v. Casey and the Deconstruction of Strict
Scrutiny
Immediately following Roe, as states could no longer ban abortion,
a number of measures were enacted across the country in order to restrict
access rather than ban the procedure outright.153 Due to this constant
testing of the Roe standard, the stage was set for another discussion on
how far a state could go in terms of regulating abortion access—
particularly in the face of such a polarized nation that could not seem to
agree on how it felt about abortion.154 Ultimately, the Court determined
Roe stretched too far, and the abortion access movement was dealt a
harsh blow in 1992 with the holding of Planned Parenthood v. Casey.155
Casey examined the constitutionality of five Pennsylvania statutory
provisions: (1) a woman must be given informed consent of the abortion
procedure; (2) said informed consent must be provided to the woman
seeking an abortion twenty-four hours before the procedure is
performed; (3) a minor must obtain consent from her parents in order to
have an abortion, though the statute provides a judicial option if consent

150. As this Note discusses, the recent interpretation of the Casey standard in Whole
Woman’s Health cements abortion access within standard Substantive Due Process
jurisprudence, casting aside the “penumbra of rights” doctrine and using much stronger legal
language. See infra Part IV; see also supra Part II.
151. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 172–73 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
152. See id. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (comparing the majority opinion of Roe
to Justice Peckham’s majority opinion in Lochner).
153. See Targeted Regulations of Abortion Providers, GUTTMACHER INST.,
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/targeted-regulation-abortion-providers
[https://perma.cc/H2FM-6WWM] (last updated May 1, 2018).
154. See Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Casey and the Clinic Closings: When
“Protecting Health” Obstructs Choice, 125 YALE L.J. 1428, 1436 (2016) [hereinafter Clinic
Closings].
155. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873–74 (1992).
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cannot be obtained; (4) a married woman must obtain consent from her
spouse before obtaining an abortion; and (5) abortion clinics must
comply with reporting requirements enacted by the state on all of the
provisions listed above.156
However, instead of applying the strict scrutiny standard created in
Roe, the Court struck down the trimester approach157 and replaced the
strict scrutiny standard with a new, undefined standard: the “undue
burden” standard.158 The “undue burden” standard, facially, is simple: a
state is free to regulate abortion so long as it does not pose an “undue
burden” upon a woman’s right to seek an abortion.159 In application,
however, the Casey holding cast the country into the very “jurisprudence
of doubt” that Justice O’Connor warned so strongly against in her
majority opinion.160
The “undue burden” standard is one that has been difficult to peg
down, in that it does not necessarily fit within any neat box of
constitutional review. It has been labeled by legal scholars as something
resembling a stronger rational basis standard, but that labeling has been
struck down by Supreme Court Justices currently presiding from the
bench.161 Indeed, “undue burden” is an abortion-specific standard of
review that is not utilized in any other examination of other named
fundamental rights.162 Regardless of what you label the “undue burden”
standard (be it a new standard or a standard of rational basis variety), it
is certainly a massive step away from the strict scrutiny standard
provided in Roe, and casts a great deal of ambiguity into the
jurisprudence that had previously governed both the Substantive Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the right to seek an
abortion.
1. The Fallout of Casey
The holding in Casey opened the doors to an onslaught of TRAP
laws enacted by state legislators claiming to protect the interests of
women’s health and safety. In actuality, those laws only placed

156. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3204–08 (1990); see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 843.
157. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 873.
158. Id. at 874.
159. Id. at 875.
160. Id. at 844 (“Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.”).
161. Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S.
Ct. 2292 (2016) (No. 15-274).
162. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2321–23 (2016) (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
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obstacles in the paths of women seeking a safe and legal abortion.163 No
longer protected by the strict scrutiny that Roe required during the first
trimester, abortion providers across the country were now faced with
zoning requirements that no other medical professionals had to comply
with. For example, abortion clinics had to comply with ambulatory
surgical center provisions, forcing abortion clinics to purchase expensive
equipment that they had no use for, or face sudden unemployment.164
The fallout of Casey was immense and immediate. The “abortion
desert” that stretches from the Southeast to the Midwest of the United
States165 grew impossibly larger after the passage of Casey and the
undue burden standard.166 As the Court only struck down the spousal
notification requirement of Pennsylvania’s statute,167 every other
provision in the statute was ruled constitutional under the Court’s
newfound “undue burden” standard.168
This deference to the
Pennsylvania legislature did not go unnoticed by the rest of the
country.169 Indeed, many states began passing TRAP laws modeled after
Pennsylvania’s provisions, casting the nature of abortion access into an
abyss of darkness and confusion.170 This casts the nature of abortion
access as a fundamental right into some amount of darkness and
confusion.171
The sheer amount of deference given to legislatures across the
country by the Court did not only go unnoticed, but was welcomed,

163. Martin, supra note 143; see also Neal Devins, How Planned Parenthood v. Casey
(Pretty Much) Settled the Abortion Wars, 118 YALE L.J. 1318, 1336 (2009) [hereinafter
Abortion Wars].
164. See Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers, REWIRE NEWS (Mar. 19, 2016),
https://rewire.news/legislative-tracker/law-topic/targeted-regulation-of-abortion-providers
[https://perma.cc/2NJV-GXP5].
165. Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Crossing the ‘Abortion Desert’: Women Increasingly
Travel Out of Their States for the Procedure, L.A. TIMES (June 2, 2016, 3:30 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-adv-abortion-traveler-20160530-snap-story.html
[https://perma.cc/JDW3-XK5W].
166. Martin, supra note 143.
167. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 893–95 (1992).
168. Id. at 899–901.
169. Pro-life organizations quickly realized that while Roe was intact, Casey allowed
for the easier passage of TRAP laws. See Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, The
Difference a Whole Woman Makes: Protection for the Abortion Right After Whole Woman’s
Health, 126 YALE L.J. F. 149, 152 (2016) [hereinafter Difference] (“[Americans United For
Life]’s recent past-President, Charmaine Yoest, was frank in describing AUL’s state
legislative strategy: ‘As we’re moving forward at the state level, we end up hollowing out
Roe, even without the Supreme Court.’”) (citation omitted).
170. Abortion Wars, supra note 163, at 1336.
171. See Martin, supra note 143.
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particularly in the more conservative states where abortion access was
already a bleak picture.172 The effect of these TRAP laws, even postWhole Woman’s Health, remains devastating, leaving some women with
only a single abortion clinic in the entire state.173
Ultimately, the Court had left the country, prior to Whole Woman’s
Health,174 with a large swath of jurisprudence that seemed to leave
abortion rights largely unprotected.175 The “undue burden” standard
does not fit neatly within any category previously discussed by the
Supreme Court in regard to the Substantive Due Process Clause.
Arguably, it is something more than a rational basis standard of review,
but it is far too deferential to the legislature to be considered
intermediate or strict scrutiny, and in most instances, seems to fail the
“rational basis with bite” approach.176
This cloudiness surrounding the “undue burden” standard has led to
many clashes of thought within the court system, allowing for
legislatures to make the argument that any state interest (ranging from
protecting women’s health to the potentiality of life) is justifiable against
the undue burden it places upon a woman’s right to seek and obtain an
abortion.177 This bizarre test has led to the closure of hundreds of
abortion clinics across the United States, particularly in the southern
region of the country where conservative values run deep.178

172. See Abby Johnston, The Number of Abortion Clinics in the United States Gets
Lower Every Single Year, BUSTLE (Jan. 2, 2015), https://www.bustle.com/articles/56149-thenumber-of-abortion-clinics-in-the-united-states-gets-lower-every-single-year
[https://perma.cc/P4QD-LGH6].
173. Seven states have only one abortion clinic within their jurisdiction. See Allison
McCann, The Last Clinics, VICE (May 23, 2017), https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/paz4bv/
last-clinics-seven-states-one-abortion-clinic-left [https://perma.cc/72X6-7QD3]. These states
are Kentucky, West Virginia, Missouri, Wyoming, South Dakota, North Dakota, and
Mississippi. Id. An eighth state, Arkansas, only has one abortion clinic that can perform both
surgical and medicinal abortions. Id.
174. See generally Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016)
(striking down two Texan TRAP laws as unconstitutional).
175. See Clinic Closings, supra note 154, at 1436.
176. See Freeman, supra note 40, at 292–94.
177. While the “potentiality of life” was discussed in Roe as a legitimate state interest,
anti-abortion legislatures have shifted their language from the “potentiality of life” to
“protecting women’s health” in order to guise their true intentions when creating TRAP
laws—to close abortion clinics. See Clinic Closings, supra note 154, at 1430.
178. In some states, prior to Whole Woman’s Health, the only reason why TRAP laws
failed was because it would have closed the only abortion clinic in the state—causing an
undue burden upon women in that specific state. See Daniel J. Glass, Not in My Hospital: The
Future of State Statutes Requiring Abortion Providers to Maintain Admitting Privileges at
Local Hospitals, 49 AKRON L. REV. 249, 270–72 (2016).
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C. The Partial-Birth Abortion Act of 2003: Stenberg and Gonzales
The manner in which the Supreme Court applied Casey only grew
grimmer with the Court’s holding in Gonzales v. Carhart, a decision that
upheld a federal partial-birth abortion ban.179 The decision sent the
message to abortion rights activists across the country that abortion
remains different.180 However, in deciding Gonzales, the Court
counteracted its own reproductive autonomy jurisprudence in order to
craft a different standard by which to judge abortion.181
Just seven years before their decision in Gonzales, the Court struck
down a Nebraska partial-birth abortion ban as a violation of Casey’s
undue burden standard.182 In Stenberg v. Carhart, the statute at issue
had no exception for medical emergencies or risk to the mother’s health
and prevented a woman’s right to choose a “dilation and extraction”
(D&E)183 or “dilation and excavation” (D&X) as abortion methods.184
Both of these restrictions created an undue burden.185
In Stenberg, the Court references numerous pieces of evidence
submitted by medical professionals in support of Dr. Carhart’s usage of
the D&E procedure, which the district court below relied on when
making its determination that the D&E ban was a violation of the
Constitution.186 Nebraska’s argument was that a health exception187 was

179. See generally, Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). For a more nuanced
discussion of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 and the problematic nature of
banning late-term abortion, see generally Tamara F. Kushnir, Comment, It’s My Body, It’s My
Choice: The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1117 (2004).
180. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 170–71 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Today’s decision is alarming. It refuses to take Casey and Stenberg seriously. It
tolerates, indeed applauds, federal intervention to ban nationwide a procedure
found necessary and proper in certain cases by the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG). It blurs the line, firmly drawn in
Casey, between previability and postviability abortions. And, for the first time
since Roe, the Court blesses a prohibition with no exception safeguarding a
woman’s health.
Id.
181. See id. at 170 (comparing the outcome in Gonzales with Stenberg).
182. See generally Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
183. For an explanation of a D&E procedure (the most commonly used method of postfirst trimester abortion), see id. at 923–27 (2000).
184. For an explanation of a D&X procedure, see id. at 927–29.
185. Id. at 938.
186. Id. at 928–30.
187. Both Roe and Casey require an exception for all abortion procedures to allow the
procedure if the life or health of the woman is in jeopardy, regardless of how far along she is
into the pregnancy. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992).
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not necessary; they relied only on their belief that the evidence provided
at the district court was incorrect, and thus failed to meet their burden.188
Stenberg, in expressing the fact that abortion regulations must have a
health exception for the mother, regardless of the viability of the fetus,
had two important effects. It was a small step forward in terms of
protecting abortion access, and a step toward a true rational basis
standard when the Court rejected all of Nebraska’s reasons for not
having a health exception as insufficient on their face.189 However,
Stenberg still dances around the notion that a state’s supposed legitimate
interest in requiring a doctor to perform any procedure other than the
procedure that a doctor believes is best for his or her own patient may be
unconstitutional on its face.190
What made Gonzales different, according to the Court? The answer
lies in the originator of the legislation: is the Court monitoring the factfinding of a state when determining whether or not pseudoscience is
being used in determining abortion legislation, or is the Court examining
the fact-finding of the federal Congress doing precisely the same
thing?191
In 2003, Congress passed the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act192 in
direct response to Stenberg.193 Along with the passage of this law came

188. See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 931–32.
189. See id. at 937–38.
190. See id. at 946–47 (Stevens, J., concurring).
191. Indeed, the Supreme Court was willing to strike down Nebraska’s presented
evidence rife with pseudoscience that ran contrary to medical evidence, but would not do the
same with the federal Congress. See id. at 931–32 (rejecting State arguments against medical
evidence provided by Carhart); cf. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 175–76 (2007)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (pointing out the Court’s acceptance of pseudoscience in upholding
the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act).
192. See 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2016).
193. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 141. After Stenberg, Congress took great issue with the
Court’s determination that “D&X” and “D&E” abortions were considered medically safe and
passed the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 108 Pub.
L. No. 105, 117 Stat. 1201. The Congressional record in the passage of the bill is rife with
discussion concerning the evidence the Court discussed in Stenberg, and the rejection of
evidence presented by Nebraska at trial, particularly regarding the health and safety of the
type of abortion Dr. Carhart performs.
However, the great weight of evidence presented at the Stenberg trial and other
trials challenging partial-birth abortion bans, as well as at extensive Congressional
hearings, demonstrates that a partial-birth abortion is never necessary to preserve
the health of a woman, poses significant health risks to a woman upon whom the
procedure is performed, and is outside of the standard of medical care.
PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTION BAN ACT OF 2003, 149 CONG. REC. H4922, 4922 (daily ed. June
4, 2003).
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factual findings challenging the findings of the safety of D&E and D&X
in Stenberg.194 Ultimately, the Court determined that the Partial-Birth
Abortion Act was neither vague nor unconstitutional on its face, and it
did not pose an undue burden due to overbreadth.195 For the purposes of
undue burden, the Court determined that because the Act did not prohibit
all forms of D&E, it did not violate the Casey standard.196 While
Nebraska’s statute prohibited all forms of D&E, the Partial-Birth
Abortion Act only bans intact D&E, thus differentiating the Act from the
Nebraska statute.197 Further, evidence offered by abortion providers who
perform D&E on a daily basis was summarily rejected by the Court as
being inadequate to prove the Act negatively impacted abortion
providers who utilize the procedure.198 Even more incredibly, the Court
did not allow for a health and safety exception with the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act, in direct contrast with previous abortion
jurisprudence.199
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Gonzales also points to the prevalence
of pseudoscience within the Congressional findings that led to the
Partial-Birth Abortion Act, factual findings on which the majority
opinion in Gonzales relied.200 As the Supreme Court is bound to the
findings of the court below,201 the carte blanche nature of the “undue
burden” standard, and the avoidance of the Court to utilize the full
weight of the Substantive Due Process Clause when examining
reproductive justice, is once again exposed.202 How legitimate is a state
interest that relies on faulty, often false, medical evidence which could
potentially lead to the criminal prosecution of both medical professionals
and women?203
The utilization of pseudoscience in order to make a state interest

194. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 141.
195. Id. at 147.
196. Id. at 150.
197. Id. at 150–52.
198. Id. at 154.
199. Id. at 170–71 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
200. See id. at 175–76.
201. See id. at 174–75.
202. See Clinic Closings, supra note 154, at 1447 (discussing the distinction between
the application of the “undue burden” standard depending on what TRAP law is before
different circuit courts).
203. See Nicholas J. Little, Meet Vincent Rue, the Man Behind the Pseudoscience of
Abortion Restrictions, SALON (Mar. 2, 2016), http://www.salon.com/2016/03/02/
meet_vincent_rue_the_man_behind_the_pseudoscience_of_abortion_restrictions/
[https://perma.cc/SB9D-7UUD].
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appear “legitimate” alone is enough material for an entirely separate
Note topic. However, the utilization of false medical evidence rears its
head in a large majority of TRAP law cases—including Whole Woman’s
Health v. Hellerstedt, the Court’s most recent abortion decision.204 The
Court’s previous reliance on legislative evidence, and its avoidance of
affording abortion and reproductive justice the full protection of the
Fourteenth Amendment, came to a head with a return to a Texan statute
which negatively impacted millions of women across the state.205
III.

THE ROAD TO WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH

Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt began in a dramatic fashion,
with an eleven-hour filibuster by a State Senator wearing bright pink
sneakers and a back brace.206 The scene within the Texas Capitol during
the passage of the controversial statute that became the main character in
Whole Woman’s Health portrayed an accurate depiction of where
abortion access stood across the country: women in the balconies
screaming “let her speak” in support of the filibuster initiated by State
Senator Wendy Davis, as the mostly male electorate attempted to pass
the bill regardless of time having run out.207 Eventually, the bill was
passed, and abortion providers in Texas immediately sought an
injunction.208 This set the stage for a re-examination of Casey and, as
this Note will argue, a clarification of a muddied standard.

204. While “pseudoscience” is not specifically mentioned within the opinion of Whole
Woman’s Health, Justice Breyer is extraordinarily pointed in his declaration that Texas did not
provide any evidence to support their claims of promoting the health and welfare of Texan
women when enacting the statutes at hand in the case. See Whole Woman’s Health v.
Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016).
205. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0031(a) (2015) (requiring doctors
that work at abortion clinics to have admitting privileges at nearby hospitals); TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 245.010(a) (2015) (requiring abortion clinics to comply with the same
standards as ambulatory surgical centers, regardless of whether abortion clinics perform onsite surgical abortions).
206. See Amanda Marcotte, What the Hell Happened in Texas Last Night?, SLATE
(June 26, 2013, 10:02 AM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2013/06/26/
wendy_davis_and_pro_choice_protesters_win_the_night_in_texas.html
[https://perma.cc/
JT3R-NJEL].
207. For a video recording of the final five minutes of Senator Davis’s eleven-hour
filibuster of the omnibus bill at discussion in this Note, see The Texas Tribune, Final
Moments of Filibuster, YOUTUBE (June 27, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
NlEHJNTQeRs.
208. Laura Bassett, Texas Sued Over Abortion Law Wendy Davis Tried to Block,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/27/texasabortion-lawsuit_n_4002869.html [https://perma.cc/6KQR-MTLK].
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A. Showdown in Texas: Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt
In 2013, the Texas legislature introduced a piece of legislation
labeled House Bill 2 (H.B. 2).209 Though H.B. 2 included numerous
anti-abortion provisions, the two most controversial (and arguably most
devastating) required doctors who worked at abortion clinics to have
admitting privileges,210 and required that abortion clinics comply with
the same standards as an ambulatory surgical center.211 While, facially,
these two provisions seem to be on-board with what is considered
constitutional under Casey, the effects of H.B. 2 quickly became
apparent soon after the bill was put into effect.212
In 2012, there were over forty abortion clinics in Texas; after H.B. 2
took effect, the number dropped by roughly half.213 Immediately
following the passage of H.B. 2, a group of abortion providers (including
the named Plaintiff, Whole Woman’s Health) sought an injunction from
the district court, in addition to a declaratory judgment that H.B. 2 was

209. The Supreme Court, when deciding Whole Woman’s Health, considered two
Texan statutes. Colloquially, the two statutes have come to be known by the house bill by
which they were introduced and will be known throughout this Note as “H.B. 2.” Whole
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2296 (2016).
210. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0031(a)(1) (Oct. 29, 2013).
Admitting privileges require that a doctor essentially be a staff member of a hospital, able to
admit patients into that specific hospital for an overnight stay. Paul Waldman, The ‘Admitting
Privileges’ Sham, and the Future of Abortion in America, WEEK (June 11, 2015),
http://theweek.com/articles/559840/admitting-privileges-sham-future-abortion-america
[https://perma.cc/NZZ7-G7WF]. For abortion providers, obtaining these privileges are not
only an additional hurdle to practice, but often impossible in certain states. See id.
211. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 245.010(a) (Apr. 2, 2015). Ambulatory
surgical center requirements force abortion clinics to purchase equipment that may not be
needed in order to safely perform abortions. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2302–03.
Additionally, H.B. 2 allowed actual ambulatory surgical centers to waive the requirements but
did not allow such waivers for abortion clinics. Id.
212. New Research Reveals Devastating Impact of Clinic Shutdown Laws on Texas
Women, CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS. (Oct. 5, 2015), https://www.reproductiverights.org/pressroom/new-research-reveals-devastating-impact-of-clinic-shutdown-laws-on-texas-women
[https://perma.cc/6E2F-LJ9U].
213. The numbers of how many clinics remained in Texas after H.B. 2’s passage are in
dispute. Generally speaking, the agreed statistic is about half of Texas’ abortion clinics were
closed due to the legislation. See Alexa Ura, et. al., Here Are the Texas Abortion Clinics That
Have Closed Since 2013, TEXAS TRIBUNE (June 28, 2016, 6:00 AM),
https://www.texastribune.org/2016/06/28/texas-abortion-clinics-have-closed-hb2-passed2013/ [https://perma.cc/NLJ9-NSER]. The Supreme Court cites the numbers as “over forty”
clinics existed prior to H.B. 2 and the “number dropped by almost half leading up to and in the
wake of enforcement of the admitting-privileges requirement that went into effect in lateOctober 2013.” Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2301 (quoting Whole Woman’s Health
v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 681 (W.D. Tex. 2014)).
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unconstitutional and a violation of the undue burden standard.214 The
injunction was granted and H.B. 2 was declared unconstitutional by the
district court.215
The Fifth Circuit, however, vacated the district court’s injunction.216
Stating that the district court had misinterpreted the Casey standard and
erred on the merits, the Fifth Circuit found Texas’ legitimate state
interest of regulating abortion clinics for the safety and wellbeing of
women to be adequate. The Fifth Circuit’s decision did not require
Texas to provide evidence that H.B.2 actually addressed the safety and
wellbeing of women.217 The Fifth Circuit’s refusal to examine the
evidence offered by Whole Woman’s Health as to the effect of H.B. 2218
unveiled a problem within the undue burden standard: if a state is
allowed a blank check to regulate abortion, what is available to review
their powers on regulating abortion? How legitimate is a state interest
when the interest is so vague as protecting the welfare of women?219
The crux of Whole Woman’s Health is, ultimately, the legitimacy of
Texas’ state interest. Further, the unasked question of Whole Woman’s
Health was whether a state could continue to offer the health and safety
of women as a legitimate state interest without offering proof established
upon actual medical evidence.220 The Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of
Casey allowed for the possibility that Texas, simply by stating that the
intention of the legislation was to protect women’s health, had fulfilled
their burden of the undue burden test.221 Whole Woman’s Health pointed
to the very problem the Casey standard allowed: the unfettered
allowance of TRAP laws that have nothing to do with protecting
women’s health and everything to do with blocking access to a
procedure that was guaranteed as a fundamental right in 1973.222

214. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2301.
215. Id. at 2303.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 2303–04.
218. Incredibly, the Fifth Circuit stated that Texan “women in El Paso wishing to have
an abortion could use abortion providers in nearby New Mexico” to alleviate their undue
burden of not having an available abortion clinic within their own state. Id. at 2304.
219. Texas repeatedly stated, both within the record and at oral argument, that Texas’
main objective with H.B. 2 was to protect the safety and welfare of women. Transcript of
Oral Argument, supra note 161, at 52–53.
220. See Brief for Petitioners at 12–14, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 135 S.
Ct. 2292 (2016) (No. 15-274).
221. See id. at 32–34.
222. See Difference, supra note 169, at 151.
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B. The Burden Is Undue: Whole Woman’s Health Decided
Ultimately, the Supreme Court (in a 5-3 decision, following the
death of Justice Scalia) ruled in favor of Whole Woman’s Health,
determining that H.B. 2 had violated the Substantive Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Casey standard.223 Justice Breyer,
writing for the majority, cited the evidence within the record that the
district court examined, stating that the findings the district court made
based on the record were not clearly erroneous.224 Further, the Court
held that the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of Casey was incorrect.225 The
Fifth Circuit stated that a state law is “constitutional if: (1) it does not
have the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of
a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus; and (2) it is
reasonably related to (or designed to further) a legitimate state
interest.”226 In other words, the Fifth Circuit required Whole Woman’s
Health to show intent of obstruction to the right of abortion, rather than
the disparate impact, of H.B. 2.
The Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of H.B. 2 is problematic for
numerous reasons. Mainly, if a court required every abortion provider or
woman to prove that the state legislature’s intent behind every TRAP
law was to dismantle the abortion clinic infrastructure, no case would
proceed forward.227 H.B. 2 was deliberately worded to target abortion
clinics directly, but under the guise of protecting women’s health and
welfare.228 Had Whole Woman’s Health been required to prove the
malicious intent of the Texan legislature, they almost certainly would
have lost.229
223. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2320.
224. Id. at 2316.
225. Id. at 2309.
226. Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 572 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’d, Whole
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
227. The undue burden standard requires that a state not pose a burden upon a woman’s
right to seek an abortion, indicating that a state could not pass a statute with the intent of
creating obstacles in a woman’s path. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877
(1992). This is, as has been discussed, uncomfortably vague. See supra Subpart II.B. This
was particularly apparent in Gonzales v. Carhart, where Justice Ginsburg commented upon
the inaccuracies of pseudoscience relied upon by Congress in passing the Partial-Birth
Abortion Act, which the Supreme Court ignored in favor of taking Congress’ word that the
statute was passed to protect both women and the potentiality of life. Gonzales v. Carhart,
550 U.S. 124, 174–77 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
228. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300 (explaining the two provisions of
H.B. 2 that were under scrutiny within the case).
229. While the Court did not take evidence into account when determining Casey,
Justice Breyer soundly rejected Texas’ stated intention in Whole Woman’s Health, as the state
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Instead, Justice Breyer emphasized the importance of the district
court’s consideration of “the existence or nonexistence of medical
benefits” when examining an abortion regulation.230 Additionally,
Justice Breyer voiced concern for the number of clinics that were closed
as a result of H.B. 2.231 Even if a few abortion clinics coincidentally
closed around the time H.B. 2 was enacted for unrelated reasons,
“common sense” dictates that the majority of these closures were
because of the stringent requirements placed upon abortion clinics by
H.B. 2, and that the closures would place an insurmountable burden
upon the abortion clinics that managed to escape H.B. 2 regulations.232
The decision in Whole Woman’s Health opened the door to the
acceptance of an established constitutional standard by which to protect
abortion providers and abortion access.233 Whole Woman’s Health also
established the need for the state to prove that their legislation has a
legitimate purpose.234 Texas, when asked at oral argument, could not
provide a single instance of a Texan woman who had been adversely
affected by the existing abortion regulations in place.235 Indeed, Texas
could only point to an instance in Pennsylvania where abortion
regulations were inadequate to prevent a tragedy.236 That specific
instance, the majority points out, was exceptionally horrific and,
therefore, rare—and even if that scandal was a common occurrence,

did not provide evidence supporting their intention. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 912–26 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (discussing the absence of
evidence that the Pennsylvanian statute met the goals of the state in protecting women’s
health); cf. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309 (commenting upon the absence of
evidence in Texas’ argument and stating it as a reason for the invalidity of the statute).
230. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309.
231. See id. at 2301–03.
232. Id. at 2317.
233. See Dennis Pathroff, Comment, Abortion and Birth Control—United States
Supreme Court Declares Texas’ Restrictions on Abortion Facilities Unconstitutional: Impact
on States with Similar Abortion Restrictions, 92 N.D. L. REV. 213, 228–29 (2016).
234. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309.
235. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 161, at 47–49.
236. Texas was one of many states that passed stricter abortion regulations after the
Kermit Gosnell Scandal, which concerned an abortion doctor in Pennsylvania who was
convicted of murder. See Jon Hurdle & Trip Gabriel, Philadelphia Abortion Doctor Guilty of
Murder in Late-Term Procedures, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/05/14/us/kermit-gosnell-abortion-doctor-found-guilty-of-murder.html. The details of the
case are exceptionally gruesome and were seen as a rallying cry for anti-abortion activists to
ban the procedure altogether, even though the atrocities that Dr. Gosnell committed were
considered anything but abortion. See id. Texas, by their own admission, states that H.B. 2
was in reaction to said scandal in Pennsylvania. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 161,
at 63–64.
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Texas had been avoiding these atrocities before H.B. 2 without
unnecessary additional regulations.237
This rejection of hysteria and pseudoscience is reinforced by Justice
Ginsburg’s two-page concurrence, which flatly labels H.B. 2 as a TRAP
law and sends a clear message to legislatures about their TRAP laws:
they likely will not survive judicial review under Casey and Roe.238 This
resounding rejection of unnecessary restrictions, while not the
commanding opinion, sends a clear message to the lower courts that
decorative language draping around oppressive legislation is not enough
to meet the Casey burden.239 If anything, the Court in Whole Woman’s
Health chose to utilize the Casey standard to protect, rather than defer.240
However clear-cut Whole Woman’s Health is on its face, it is not
without criticism; the dissenting opinions in Whole Woman’s Health,
much like the dissents in Lawrence, echo protestations that the majority
exceeded the bounds of the Fourteenth Amendment.241 Justices Thomas
and Alito both penned separate dissenting opinions, each focusing on a
different area of the law that they felt the majority had violated in
striking down H.B. 2.242 Justice Thomas, having been a vocal opponent
of the Court’s abortion jurisprudence since Casey,243 accused the
majority of scrapping the old standard in favor of something stronger
without any precedent.244 Justice Alito interpreted the statistics and

237. Justice Breyer, when inquiring about the Gosnell Scandal’s place in Texas’ legal
argument, quite plainly asked: “So what is the benefit to the woman of a procedure that is
going to cure a problem of which there is not one single instance in the nation, though perhaps
there is one, but not in Texas.” Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 161, at 48.
238. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2321 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
239. Id. (“Given [the safety of abortion as a medical procedure], it is beyond rational
belief that H.B. 2 could genuinely protect the health of women, and certain that the law
‘would simply make it more difficult for them to obtain abortions.’”) (quoting Planned
Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Schimel, 806 F.3d 908, 910 (7th Cir. 2015)).
240. Whole Woman’s Health places a higher burden upon the state in order to restrict
and regulate abortion, rather than deferring to the state’s purported expertise concerning the
medical procedure. See id. at 2326 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“And the majority seriously
burdens States, which must guess at how much more compelling their interests must be to pass
muster and what ‘commonsense inferences’ of an undue burden this Court will identify
next.”).
241. See id. at 2326–27; cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 588 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
242. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2321 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(discussing the difference between Casey and Whole Woman’s Health); see also id. at 2342–
43 (Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing the majority’s reliance on inference, rather than hard fact,
in regard to abortion clinic closures in Texas).
243. Id. at 2324 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
244. Id. at 2321.
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evidence provided in the record as not being an undue burden, claiming
that the majority wrongly utilized inference without concrete conclusions
as to why so many abortion clinics closed.245 Justice Thomas also
voiced his opinion that Roe v. Wade is based on faulty law,246 and as
previously discussed in this Note, Justice Thomas is not necessarily
wrong.247
In examining the dissenting opinions of Whole Woman’s Health and
the supposed emergence of a new standard of review, one must look at
Substantive Due Process jurisprudence as a whole.248 With previous
reproductive justice cases, the Court’s avoidance of using the
Substantive Due Process Clause during the Lochner era caused a rift in
jurisprudence that allowed for claims of judicial intervention and
activism.249 Whole Woman’s Health utilized the full weight of the
rational basis standard, unlike its predecessors, and can be fairly and
equitably compared with the previously discussed cases.250
IV.

“UNDUE BURDEN WITH TEETH”: A NEW STANDARD EMERGES

The determination that Whole Woman’s Health posits a stronger
standard by which to assess abortion regulations is not a novel
conclusion.251 However, this Note argues that Whole Woman’s Health
strengthens the Casey standard into something resembling “undue
burden with teeth” and returns abortion to established Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence in regard to (strengthened) rational basis
scrutiny. As will be discussed, the Supreme Court’s determination was
not solely based on the burden that the statute placed upon women
seeking an abortion, but the benefit such statutes had for the citizens who

245. The majority of Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion focuses upon the res judicata
issue within Whole Woman’s Health, which is not at issue in this Note. See id. at 2342–43
(Alito, J., dissenting). However, Justice Alito also comments upon the majority’s reliance
upon inference, rather than established fact, that the ambulatory surgical center requirement
forced abortion clinics to close. See id.
246. See id. at 2324 (Thomas, J., dissenting). “I remain fundamentally opposed to the
Court’s abortion jurisprudence.” Id.
247. See supra Section I.B.2 (exploring contraception); cf. supra Subpart II.A
(examining Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); supra Subpart II.B (examining Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)).
248. See supra Part I (discussing the Substantive Due Process Clause).
249. See supra Section I.B.2 (exploring contraception); cf. supra Subpart II.A
(examining Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); supra Subpart II.B (examining Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)).
250. See supra Part I (discussing Substantive Due Process jurisprudence); cf. infra Part
IV (exploring the new Whole Woman’s Health standard).
251. See generally Foley, supra note 130.
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required abortions.252 This standard—as Justice Thomas discusses at
length in his dissenting opinion—is not only a departure from Casey, but
is an entirely new standard of review.253
A. Burdens v. Benefits: Justice Thomas’ Dissent
The Supreme Court’s decision to utilize evidence that showed
H.B. 2 was a catastrophe for women’s health and welfare in its
determination that Texas had violated the Substantive Due Process
Clause is a massive departure from established Casey jurisprudence.254
Casey specifically rejects the notion of utilizing the alleged benefits of a
statute when determining the effect of a statute regulating abortion, only
speaking to the burden of a statute upon a woman’s right to choose.255
The notion of Casey’s undue burden standard taking into account the
effect a statute has upon the women it is supposed to protect is a concept
that comes from Justice Stevens’ concurrence within Casey—not
binding law, but nonetheless compelling to the majority in Whole
Woman’s Health that decided the case.256
While Justice Thomas and his fellow dissenters vocalized their
disapproval, they also provided a stronger argument toward the
realization of a stronger standard for abortion access.257 Indeed, as
Justice Thomas writes: “Whatever scrutiny the majority applies to
Texas’ law, it bears little resemblance to the undue-burden test the Court
articulated in [Casey], and its successors.”258 He is correct; Whole
Woman’s Health changes the game entirely.

252. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016).
253. See id. at 2325 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
254. Id.; see Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 165–66 (2007); cf. Planned Parenthood
of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 888–94 (1992) (showing that the majority of Casey relied
on record evidence, not medical evidence, to make their determination in regard to the spousal
notification requirement).
255. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2325 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also
Casey, 505 U.S. at 901.
256. Casey, 505 U.S. at 920 (“A state-imposed burden on the exercise of a
constitutional right is measured both by its effects and by its character: A burden may be
‘undue’ either because the burden is too severe or because it lacks a legitimate, rational
justification.”) (emphasis added). It is also worth noting that Justice Stevens, along with
Justice Blackmun (the original author of Roe), voted to uphold Roe’s strict scrutiny standard
of the 3-2-4 plurality, rather than supplant it with Casey’s undue burden standard. Id. at 912–
26 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Foley, supra note 130, at 157.
257. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2321 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(discussing the difference between Casey’s standard and the standard applied by the majority
in Whole Woman’s Health).
258. Id. (citation omitted).
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In rejecting the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of Casey, the Court
elevated the “undue burden” standard to a true balancing test—one that
examines the ability of a woman to seek an abortion against a state’s
legitimate interest in regulating abortion.259 As Justice Thomas points
out numerous times in his dissent, this is not the standard created in
Casey by the majority-plurality.260 He, this Note argues, is correct.
B. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Substantive Due Process Clause:
“Undue Burden” Meets “Rational Basis Review”
The “benefits-and-burdens balancing test”261 is not only a departure
from Casey, but also from previous Supreme Court jurisprudence
regarding abortion.262 While the majority in Whole Woman’s Health
states that the standard used is “undue burden,” it is certainly not a
stretch of the imagination to see that the language utilized in Whole
Woman’s Health provides a powerful tool with which to challenge
TRAP laws.263 Forcing states to provide evidence of their legislative
intent without hiding behind the sham that is “women’s health and
welfare” is a massive step away from Casey’s vague deferential standard
that had no real label. Whole Woman’s Health, in holding Texas
accountable for their legislative decisions regarding abortion, sent a loud
message: legislatures cannot masquerade TRAP laws as protective
legislation for women; the Supreme Court will not allow it.264
In examining past Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence and
comparing Whole Woman’s Health with previously utilized balancing
tests in substantive due process cases, it is evident that the Court has
finally placed abortion and reproductive justice on the same level of
importance and protection as the rights protected by what many call

259. See id. at 2324 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Finally, even if a law imposes no
‘substantial obstacle’ to women’s access to abortions, the law now must have more than a
‘reasonabl[e] relat[ion] to . . . a legitimate state interest.’ These precepts are nowhere to be
found in Casey or its successors.”) (emphasis added) (alterations in original).
260. Id. at 2325 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Of the nine Justices who both heard and
decided Casey, only two remained on the bench at the time Whole Woman’s Health was
argued and decided: Justice Kennedy (who was a member of the Casey plurality-majority) and
Justice Thomas (who dissented in both Casey and Whole Woman’s Health). Justice Kennedy
did not write an opinion for Whole Woman’s Health.
261. Id. at 2324.
262. See generally Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997).
263. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309–10.
264. See id. at 2320–21 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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“rational basis with bite.”265 Lawrence266 and Obergefell267 rejected the
states’ reasoning of “morality” for passing anti-LGBTQ-targeted
discriminatory policies. Casey, too, emphasized that morality is never
satisfactory to restrict the rights and liberties of a citizen.268 However,
while Obergefell and Lawrence utilized a true “rational basis with bite”
balancing test in order to strike down discriminatory legislation, Casey
applied an abortion-specific standard that was both vague and far too
deferential to the legislature.269 The language utilized in Whole
Woman’s Health and the navigation of the Fourteenth Amendment is far
more comparable to prior Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence and
Roe, rather than the deferential standard set forth by Casey.270 While the
majority is careful to label the standard used as “undue burden,” Justice
Thomas’ point is valid: this is different.271 The question remains,
though: how are lower courts handling like cases, and has this caused a
massive amount of confusion like Whole Woman’s Health’s older sister,
Casey?
C. Whole Woman’s Health: The Impact
Since the decision in Whole Woman’s Health, lower courts have
been striking down TRAP laws of similar quality and impact to H.B.
2.272 In Alabama, a TRAP law focusing on school zones was struck
down as unconstitutional under the “undue burden” standard, citing
Whole Woman’s Health as precedent to examine the benefits of such a

265. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582 (2003) (rejecting Texas’ argument for
“morality” as a legitimate state interest); see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584,
2596–97 (2015) (rejecting the argument for immorality in restricting homosexual couples
from being married); cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)
(stating that morality is not a satisfactory state interest while incorporating the “undue burden”
standard, rather than rational basis).
266. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582.
267. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596–97 (discussing the United States’ history of
considering homosexuality immoral, which the Court rejected as a legitimate state interest in
outlawing same-sex marriage).
268. Casey, 505 U.S. at 850.
269. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596–97; Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582; Casey, 505
U.S. at 850.
270. See supra Parts I–II.
271. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2325–26 (2016)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
272. See W. Ala. Women’s Ctr. v. Miller, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1313, 1347 (M.D. Ala.
2016); Burns v. Cline, 382 P.3d 1048, 1054–55 (Okla. 2016) (Combs, V.C.J, concurring);
Capital Care Network of Toledo v. State Dep’t of Health, 58 N.E.3d 1207, 1211 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2016); Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky. v. Comm’r, No. 1:16-cv-00763-TWP-DML,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84917, at *25 (S.D. Ind. June 30, 2016).

296

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:257

statute in comparison to the burdens placed upon women seeking an
abortion.273 In Wisconsin, an admitting privileges requirement similar to
H.B. 2 was deemed unconstitutional.274 The Court denied certiorari on
appeal275 after deciding Whole Woman’s Health.276 Virginia scrapped
ambulatory surgical center requirements for abortion clinics, citing
Whole Woman’s Health as the reasoning to be rid of its TRAP laws.277
The Court also denied certiorari to Mississippi’s appeal of a similarly
struck TRAP law.278 More TRAP laws have been struck down in
Oklahoma,279 Ohio,280 and Indiana.281 The impact of Whole Woman’s
Health has been felt the most, perhaps, by the named plaintiff of the
case: post-victory, Whole Woman’s Health successfully won another
lawsuit against the state of Texas utilizing Whole Woman’s Health as an
argument against a new TRAP law imposing specific conditions upon
second-term abortions.282

273. See W. Ala. Women’s Ctr., 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1347 (striking down an Alabama
school zoning ordinance that would have shut down numerous clinics).
274. While Schimel was decided before Whole Woman’s Health, the Seventh Circuit
utilized language strikingly similar to the majority opinion. See Planned Parenthood of Wis.,
Inc. v. Schimel, 806 F.3d 908, 916 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Until and unless Roe v. Wade is overruled
by the Supreme Court, a statute likely to restrict access to abortion with no offsetting medical
benefit cannot be held to be within the enacting state’s constitutional authority.”) (emphasis
added). The Supreme Court denied Wisconsin’s petition for writ of certiorari after Whole
Woman’s Health was announced. Schimel v. Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc., 136 S. Ct.
2545, 2545 (2016).
275. See Schimel, 136 S. Ct. at 2545.
276. Molly Beck, U.S. Supreme Court Rejects Wisconsin’s Appeal of Abortion
Restrictions Ruling, WIS. ST. J. (June 29, 2016), http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/govtand-politics/u-s-supreme-court-rejects-wisconsin-s-appeal-of-abortion/article_ab0f94fd-aef75d89-9d7c-a61333857460.html [https://perma.cc/5G56-FBR6].
277. See Laura Vozzella, Virginia Rolls Back Restrictions on Abortion Clinics, WASH.
POST (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/virginia-rollsback-restrictions-on-abortion-clinics/2016/10/24/9f3fb3e8-99fd-11e6-998050913d68eacb_story.html [https://perma.cc/5KMD-CXAG].
278. See Jess Bravin & Louise Radnofsky, Supreme Court Denies Mississippi,
Wisconsin Efforts to Reinstate Abortion Laws, WALL ST. J. (June 28, 2016),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/supreme-court-denies-mississippi-wisconsin-efforts-to-reinstateabortion-laws-1467124416.
279. See Burns v. Cline, 382 P.3d 1048, 1051–53 (Okla. 2016).
280. See Capital Care Network of Toledo v. State Dep’t of Health, 58 N.E.3d 1207,
1211 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016), rev’d, 2018-Ohio-440 (2018).
281. See Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky. v. Comm’r, 194 F. Supp. 3d 818, 830 (S.D.
Ind. 2016).
282. The district court analyzed the new Texan TRAP law with a benefits-and-burdens
analysis, as this Note argues. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Paxton, No. A-17-CV-690-LY,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195268, at *35 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 22, 2017) (“Indeed, the court finds
the Act’s burdens, by definition, exceed its benefits, those burdens are undue, and the
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Overall, Whole Woman’s Health (thus far) has provided clarification
of a vague standard and protected abortion access, rather than grant new
deference to the legislature. The future of abortion access is, by and
large, not secure in the least.283 Some jurisdictions are reluctant to
expand the right to access underneath the proposed new standard. The
Eighth Circuit, for example, stated that an admitting privileges
requirement (albeit a requirement that differs from H.B. 2) promulgated
by the state of Arkansas was constitutional.284 This decision, however, is
an outlier—the majority of decisions post-Whole Woman’s Health, as
discussed above, have been favorable to a woman’s right to choose.
The rights of abortion access have typically hung in the hands of the
legislature and have remained dependent upon a base that will protect
them rather than strike them down. However, Whole Woman’s Health
has produced a new tool by which to remove total deference to the
legislature that will, hopefully, exist for some time to come.
CONCLUSION
The standards applied to the Fourteenth Amendment have an
extraordinary amount of variation depending on which fundamental right
the Supreme Court is examining.285
However, the Fourteenth
Amendment has recently begun to take the shape of the amorphous
“rational basis with bite” standard.286 This is where Whole Woman’s
Health falls into place and abortion joins the rest of the fundamental
rights and liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Substantive Due Process Clause.287

obstacles they embody are, by definition, substantial.”).
283. Recently, The United States went from a pro-choice to a pro-life executive office,
thereby shifting the balance of power—and, potentially, the fate of abortion access. See Beth
Reinhard, Donald Trump’s Victory Looks Set to Renew Battle Over Abortion Rights, WALL
ST. J. (Nov. 20, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trumps-victory-looks-set-torenew-battle-over-abortion-rights-1479671454.
284. The law requires a physician who wished to administer medicinal abortions to
have a contract with another physician who has admitting privileges. See ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 20-16-1504 (2016). To reach this decision, the Eighth Circuit determined that “the district
court was required to make a finding that the Act’s contract-physician requirement is an undue
burden for a large fraction of women seeking medication abortions in Arkansas.” Planned
Parenthood of Ark. & E. Okla. v. Jegley, 864 F.3d 953, 959 (8th Cir. 2017). The district court
erred in its discretion, as the Eighth Circuit points out that there was no numerical evidence of
how many women would be affected by the law, in contrast to Whole Woman’s Health v.
Hellerstedt. Id.
285. See supra Part I; cf. supra Part II.
286. See Pettinga, supra note 41, at 780; supra Subpart I.B.
287. See supra Part I; cf. supra Part III.
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The “undue burden” standard has wrought more harm than good
upon abortion access within the United States by creating uncertainty in
substantive due process jurisprudence.288 It is “abortion-specific,”289
crafted specifically to deal with abortion regulations passed by
legislatures that, more often than not, did more harm than good.290
Abortion, a fundamental right, is the proverbial black sheep of the
Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process Clause family; Whole
Woman’s Health does not change that fact. What has changed with
Whole Woman’s Health is the emergence of “undue burden with
teeth”—placing abortion (and, with it, reproductive justice) into the
same tier as sexual orientation, sexual conduct, and other protected
fundamental rights.291 With Whole Woman’s Health, TRAP laws can no
longer hide behind the guise of a vague standard. Now, they are subject
to a more searching scrutiny of the facts giving rise to the legislation,
and abortion access can finally begin to rebuild what was lost for over
twenty years.
The potential of Whole Woman’s Health is vast, but the actuality of
the impact of this newfound standard will be determined as legal
scholars examine the full impact of the decision in the years to come.
However, the immediate signs are positive for abortion access. While
the impact of TRAP laws will take years to overcome, the future looks
marginally brighter for abortion access underneath Whole Woman’s
Health, rather than Casey.

288. See Thomas J. Molony, Fulfilling the Promise of Roe: A Pathway for Meaningful
Pre-Abortion Consultation, 65 CATH. U. L. REV. 713, 713 (2016).
289. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2321 (2016) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
290. See State Policies on Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST., https://www.guttmacher.org/
united-states/abortion/state-policies-abortion [https://perma.cc/YD8L-QKK2] (citing that 288
abortion restrictions were adopted from 2011–2015).
291. See supra Section I.B.4 (discussing Obergefell).

